[Solomonov Seminar] 104. Solomonov seminar

[Marko Grobelnik]

Vabim vas na 104. Solomonov seminar, ki bo v torek, 
14. januarja 2003 ob 13. uri v Veliki predavalnici IJS. 

Tokratna tema posega v podrocje ekonomije in teorije iger. Gre za 
analizo efekta, ki ga poznamo pod imenom "prekletstvo zmagovalca", 
ko kupci na drazbah (ali sicer na raznih drugih trgih) preradi zmagujejo 
cetudi za to nimajo kritja oz. ekonomske osnove in jih to kasneje "udari po glavi".
Vesna Prasnikar nam bo predstavila eksperimentalno analizo tega 
efekta in predlagala nekaj nacinov kako se prodajalec zasciti pred 
tem, da dobi kupce, ki ponujajo zneske za katere nimajo pravega kritja.
...morda se bo kdo vprasal zakaj bi bilo slabo, ce nekdo ponuja previsok 
znesek? Odgovor je da zato, ker npr. pri prodaji drzavnih podjetij ali 
koncesij ni dobro dobiti kupca, ki ima v naslednjem trenutku po prevzetju 
podjetja tezave zaradi previsoke kupnine, ki jo je placal pred tem.

Po predavanju bo Vesna za zainteresirane predstavila skupni projekt 
ComLabGames (http://www.cmu.edu/comlabgames/) za simulacije 
trga in pouk eksperimentalne ekonomije.

Naslednja seminarja:
cetrtek, 16. januar: Riccardo Bellazzi - 
  Telematic management of Diabetes: current European experiences
torek, 21. januar: Aleks Jakulin - 
  Interakcije med atributi v strojnem ucenju

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Vesna Prasnikar (Carnegie Mellon University)

How to overcome "the winner's curse" 
(Kako preseci "prekletstvo zmagovalca")

We conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing. 
In each auction, the good is randomly allocated to each of the 
K highest bidders, at (K+1)st highest price. As the degree of rationing 
increases, the theoretical winner's curse decreases, and the equilibrium 
bid function increases. Experimentally, we find that bidders suffer from 
the winner's curse, and lose money on average. However, the bids in 
the experiments do adjust in the appropriate direction as the degree of 
rationing changes, providing support for the comparative statics 
implications of the theory. We demonstrate the connection between 
the experimental results and a theoretical measure of the winner's curse. 
Our results are consistent with subjects having an intuitive understanding 
of the winner's curse, but being unable to compute the equilibrium bid levels.